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The owner of a copyright' has the statutory right to exclusively
print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work.2 The
grant of these rights implies that others shall not exercise them without
the consent of the copyright proprietor; to do so would be mfnnge-
ment.3
In West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co.,4 the court, in
expressing its conception of infringement, stated that infringement
consists of the violation of the exclusive right, conferred by statute, to
reproduce copies of the original production. There can be no infringe-
ment unless there has been copying which consists of an exact or
substantial reproduction of the original.
In Emerson v. Datnes,5 the standard for determining whether there
has been-a copying was elaborated* upon:
I think, it may be laid down as the clear result of the authorities
in cases of this nature, that the true test of piracy or not is to
ascertain whether the defendant has, in fact, used the plan, arrange-
ments, and illustrations of the plaintiff, as the model of hIs own book,
with colorable alterations and variations only to disguise the use
thereof; or whether Ins workis the result of hIs own labor, skill, and
use of common materials and common sources of knowledge, open to
all men, and the resemblances are either accidental or ansing from
the nature of the subject. In other words, whether the defendant's
book is, quoad hoc, a servile or evasive imitation of the plaintiff's
work, or a bona fide onginal compilation from other common or inde-
pendent sources.0
This discussion was entered as a paper in the Nathan Burkan Memonal
Competition, August 1962.
1 17 U.S.C. §5 (1958) provides for the classification of copyrightable material
into the following categories: (a) books; (b) periodicals; (c) lectures, sermons
and addresses; (d) dramatic or draniatico-musical compositions; (e) musical
compositions; (f) maps; (g) works of art; (h) reproductions of works of art; (i)
drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character; (j) photographs;
(k) prints and pictorial illustrations; (1) motion-picture photoplays; and m)
motion pictures other than photoplays.
217 U.S.C. §1(a) (1958).
3 United States v. Wells, 176 F Supp. 630, 633 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
4 169 Fed. 833, 861 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909).
5 8 Fed. Cas. 615 (No. 4436) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).
6 Id. at 624.
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Thus, unlike patent law, copyright law does not restrict or penalize
one who independently creates an identical work.
7
When considering the aspects of copying, it is to be noted that the
form of expressing the idea, as opposed to the idea itself, is the copy-
nghtable matter.8 Once the form of expression is copied, infringement
cannot be avoided by the addition of materials,9 omission of features,1
or other colorable changes.ii Furthermore, it is no defense that the
owner was benefitted rather than mjured,' 2 that there was no intention
to infringe,'3 or that there was only a restricted use and distribution
of the mfrmgmg copies.
14
Since it is impractical to enumerate a umversal list of all the
elements involved in an infringement action, this note is limited to an
elaboration of the following four elements which must always be
established-to prove infringement:
I. Originality in the plaintiff's work;
II. Access by the defendant;
III. Copying by the defendant; and
IV Substantial appnepriation of the copyrighted material.
In discussing the aforementioned elements, emphasis will be placed
upon the degree of importance attached to them and the factors
considered necessary to prove their existence.
I. ORIGINA=iTr
Section 8 of the Copyright Act excludes the right to a copyright
on any work other than an original. 15 Therefore in an infringement
action it is not unusual for the defendant to challenge the plamtiff's
7 In Barton Candy Corp. v. Tell Chocolate Novelties Corp., 178 F Supp. 577,
581 (E.D. N.Y. 1959), the court stated:
[T]here is no prohibition imposed upon an independent reproduction
of a copyrighted work even if the two works resemble each other
because there is no copying. If the two works are the result of the
independent intellectual effort of two authors and are denved from
common sources available to all, there can be no infringement.
1See, e.g., National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d
594 (2d Cir. 1951).
9 See, e.g., Bracken v. Rosenthal, 151 Fed. 136 (C.C.N.D.11. 1907); Law-
rence v. Dana, 15 Fed. Cas. 26 (No. 8136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
10 See, e.g.. Woodman v. Lydiard-Peterson Co., 192 Fed. 67 (C.C.D.Minn.
1912).
1i See, e.g., Nutt v. National Institute, Inc., 31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929).
12 Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (E.D. Penn. 1922).
13 Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950).
14 See Ladd v. Oxnard, 75 Fed. 703 (C.C.D.Mass. 1896); Macmillan Co. v.
King, 223 Fed. 862 (D. Mass. 1914).
15 "No copyright shall subsist in the onginial text of any work which is in the
public domun, or in any work which was published in this country or any foreign
country prior to Julv 1, 1909, and has not been already copyrighted.
[Emphasis added.] 17 U.S.C. §8 (1958).
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copyright on the basis that his work is not original. If the defendant's
contention is established, the plaintiff's copyright is invalid and the
charge of infringement must fail. Thus the question of what is an
"original" becomes pertinent.
Because of the limited number of basic plots and ideas, most
copyrighted works are, in essence, expansions and variations of
previous works. As expressed in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine
Arts Inc., 6 this truism has necessitated a liberal judicial attitude
toward originality-
'Original' in reference to a copyrighted work means that the par-
ticular work owes its origin to the author No large measure of
novelty is necessary. 17
All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the
statute is that the author contributed something more than a
merely trivial' variation, something recognizably 'Ius own. Ongi-
nality in this context means little more than a prohibition of actual
copying. No matter how poor artistically the authors addition, it
is enough if it be his own.18
The use of old material' 9 by a subsequent writer will not prevent
him from obtaining a copyright on his arrangement:
The question is not, whether the materials which are used are entirely
new, and have never been used before; or even that they have never
been used before for the same purpose. The true question is, whether
the same plan, arrangement and combination of materials have been
used before for the same purpose or for any other purpose. 20
No man writes exclusively from ins own thoughts, unaided and
umnstructed by the thoughts of others. If no book could be the
subject of copy-nght which was not new and original in the elements
of winch it is composed, there could be no ground for any copy-right
in modem times, and we should be obliged to ascend very high,
even in antiquity, to find a work entitled to such eminence.
2 1
Where old material has been used in producing a new work and
this work is copied, the copyright has been infringed. It is only the
new arrangement, however, that is infringed because the old material
cannot be copyrighted.2 The basis for making the new work copy-
rightable is that "the labor of making these selections, arrangements
and combinations has entailed the exercise of skill, discretion and
creative effort."2 This necessary skill and creative effort was found
i6 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
17 Id. at 102.
18 Id. at 102-03.
19 Old material, as used in this article refers to any work which is not
protected by a copynght and can, therefore, be considered to be public property.
20Emerson v. Davies, 8 Fed. Cas. 615, 618-19 (No. 4436) (C.C.D. Mass.
1845).
21 Id. at 619.
22 Stodart v. Mutual Film Corp., 249 Fed. 507 (S.D. N.Y. 1917).
23 Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 221 P.2d 73, 79 (Cal. 1950).
[Vol. 51,
in Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger,24 where the plaintiff, who was
engaged in the reproduction of three-dimensional works of art, reduced
an original sculpture from 37 inches to 18V inches. A similar ruling
was made where the plaintiff photographed and transferred an
embroidered design, which was in the public domain, into printed
form on a dress fabric.
25
These two cases illustrate that the courts will protect the plaintiff's
statutory rights if his "work contains some substantial, not merely
trivial, originality."2 6
II. AccEss
Access means nothing more than an opportunity to copy the
plaintiff's work, and without proof that the defendant saw, heard, or
read the copyrighted work the infringement action must fail. 27 The
answer to the question of whether the defendant had access is
normally dependent upon his opportunity to copy and the similarities
that are present in the two works. Although proof of access is
generally said to be a question for the trier of facts, certain principles
of law have been developed by the courts to make a determination of
this question somewhat easier.
In Arnstem v. Porter,2s in attempting to show the relationship
between similarities and access and their effect upon proof of copying,
the court stated:
Of course, if there are no similarities, no amount of evidence of
access will suffice to prove copying. If there is evidence of access
and similarities exist, then the trier of the facts must determine
whether the similarities are sufficient to prove copying. If
evidence of access is absent, the similarities must be so striking as to
preclude the possibility that plaintiff and defendant independently
arrived at the same result.2 9
As this case indicates, the greater the similarities between the two
works, the easier it is for the trier of facts to find access, assuming of
24 177 F Supp. 265 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
2 5 Miilwoi-th Converting Corp. v. Slifk~a, 276 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1960). The
injunction against the defendant was dissolved because it was found that he bad
copied from the work in the public domain as opposed to plaintiff's mode of
expression.
26 Chamberlin v. Uns Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945).
27 In Burns v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 75 F Supp. 986, 987
(D. Mass. 1948), the court stated: "I find that there is no credible evidence that
at the time of preparing or publishing the motion picture defendant had actual
access to or had even beard of plaintiff's book. For that reason alone plaitiffs
suit should be dismissed." See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.
1946); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d 893 (8th Cir.
1946).21 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
29 Id. at 468.
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course that the copyrighted work is in general circulation. Where
the work has not been circulated proof of access is more difficult,
because of the principle that if a comparison of the two works is the
only means of establishing access, the similarities must raise more
than a doubt or suspicion to stand against the oaths of witnesses who
know the facts3 0
It can be concluded that access may be inferred from the sur-
rounding circumstances, may be found from the similarities in the
plan, arrangement and combination of materials or may be established
by showing identity of phraseology 3'
III. CoPYWG
To constitute infringement there must be a copying in some form
of the copyrighted work. Ordinarily the question of whether or not
there has been a copying is dependent upon a comparison of the
inference (of copying) to be drawn from the similarities with the
direct evidence of non-access and non-copying. If the similarities are
so insubstantial as to be incapable of rationally affording the basis
for an inference, obviously the question of copying must be answered
m the negative. However, where the use of a common source is not a
satisfactory explanation for the similarities, and where all possibilities
of access are not excluded by the physical facts, there is a strong
inference of copying.
Generally stated, a copy is that which comes so near to the original
as to convey the same idea created by the original.32 To satisfy this
definition the copying does not have to be literal, but instead may
consist of imitation, paraphrasing, or any other colorable alteration.
Imitation is normally thought to be a likeness designed to repro-
duce the style or manner of another artistic work. Although every
imitation does not constitute infringement, the courts will treat- an
imitation as a copying if it is nothing more than an attempt to disguise
a piracy of the copyrighted work. For determining when the imitation
becomes a piracv the following standard has been enunciated:
It is true the imitation may be very slight and shadowy. But on the
other hand, it may be very close, and so close as to be a mere
evasion of the copyright, although not an exact and literal copy. 33
30 See Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d 893 (8th
cir. 1946).
si See, e.g., Kovacs v. Mutual Broadcasting Sys., 221 P.2d 108 (Cal. 1950).
32 See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1,
17 (1908).
• Emerson v. Davies, 8 Fed. Cas. 615, 622 (No. 4436) (C.C.D. Mass.
1845).
[Vol. 51,
The difficulty of drawing the line between permissible and infring-
ing imitation is illustrated by the following two cases, which involve
the impersonation of an entertainer singing a copyrighted song. In
both cases it was the combination of actions, gestures, and tones of
the entertainer that was being represented, and the use of the song
was only incidental to the impersonation. The basic factual difference
between the two cases was that in one the entire song was sungi
4
while in the other only the chorus. 35 In the former the court found
infringement but in the latter the impersonation was held to be
permissible. This seems to indicate that the quantity of the work
imitated is a prinary consideration in finding the presence or absence
of copying.
While imitation involves copying the form or style of the original
work, paraphrasing involves a reproduction of the substance of the
work m other terms. The fact that the identical language and illustra-
tions were not used will not justify the appropriation of the literary
work. Paraphrasing or copying with evasion is an infringement, even
though there may be little or no conceivable identity betwee the
two works.30
The degree of paraphrasing necessary to constitute infringement
was set forth in Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc.37 The court said:
It is our conception of the area covered by the copyright statute
that when a study of the two writings is made and it is plain from the
study that one of them is not in fact the creation of the putative
author, but instead has been copied in substantial part exactly or in
transparent rephrasing to produce essentially the story of the other
writing, it ifnnges.3 8
In summary, where the internal sequence of ideas and language
compels the conclusion that the copyrighted material is the source of
the alleged infringing work, paraphrasing has been shown.
IV SUBSTANTIAL APPROPRIATION
Regardless of the form of copvini4, whether it be imitation or
paraphrasing, there must be a substantial appropriation of the copy-
righted work before liability for infringement arises. The factors most
often taken into consideration by the courts in answering the question
of whether or not there has been a substantial appropriation are:
34 Green v. Luby, 177 Fed. 287 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909).
35 Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 Fed. 977 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1903).
36 Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131, 138 (8th Cir. 1932).
37216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954).
38 Yd. at 950.
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(a) the decrease in value of the copyrighted work; (b) whether the
authors labor has been appropriated; (c) the value of the part copied;
and (d) the relative value and purpose served m each work by the
part copied.
39
In Warren v. White & Wyckoff Mfg. Co.,40 the court emphasized
the importance of some of the above mentioned factors:
I think it also entirely plain that the publication of defendant's
calendar did not in any manner affect the sale of plamtiffs book, has
not caused plaintiff any actual damage, and by its very nature could
not cause him any, because the two publications could not reasonably
be said to be competitive, and, were it not for the fact of the de-
liberate, unacknowledged, appropriation of material from plaintiff's
book, I should be inclined to treat the whole matter as a tempest in
a teapot, and, while finding for plaintiff for the nummum statutory
damages, let him have his trouble for us pains.
41
Since publications and presentations of works are made in order
that they may reach the general public, there are forms of use, and
even of copymg, that can be made without constituting infringement.
These uses are permissible by virtue of the doctrine of "fair use,"
which can basically be defined as that amount of copying permitted
by law which does not constitute infringement.
In drawing the line between fair use and substantial appropriation,
it has been stated that the quantity taken is not necessarily the
decisive factor:
With reference to the quantity and quality taken, of course no general
rule can be laid down, applicable to all cases. One writer nmght take
all the vital part of another s book, though it might be but a small
portion of the book in quantity. In many valuable books, particularly
of a scientific character, the leading ideas of the author may be very
few in number, the greater part of the work being devoted either to
the illustration or amplification of these ideas, or to the reproduction
of the ideas of other authors upon the same subject. The person who
could seize these leading ideas, or, to use an expression attributed to
Macauley, who could tear the heart out of the book, though it
involved the republication of only a single paragraph, might do the
author substantial damage, while another might republish pages
without imparting the same information. It is not only quantity, but
value and quality, that are to be regarded in determining the ques-
tion of piracy.
42
In attempting to decide whether there has been a substantial
appropriation, it must be kept in mind that "the basic test of plagiarism
30 E.g., Carr v. National Capital Press, Inc., 71 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1934);
West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 Fed. 833 (C.C.E.D.N.Y.
1909).
40 39 F.2d 922 (S.D. N.Y. 1930).
41 Id. at 923.
42 Farmer v. Elstner, 33 Fed. 494, 495-96 (C.C.E.D.Mich. 1888).
[Vol. 151,
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is whether the resemblance between the two works in question could
be recognized by ordinary observation and not by fine analysis or by
argument and dissection by experts."
43
Conclusion
The decisive factor in all infringement actions is nothing more than
a factual comparison of the works involved. Necessarily, therefore,
there is no workable definition of infringement, but instead it appears
that the courts attempt to maintain a flexible attitude in this field so
that the copyright proprietor will be protected and at the same tune
future work in the various fields will not be stifled.
Lowell T Hughes
43 Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F Supp. 45, 70 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
